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1 Introduction
The economics of tax compliance has at its foundations the seminal analy-
sis of Becker (1968) on optimal law enforcement: the inuential portfolio
model of tax compliance (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Christiansen, 1980;
Srinivasan, 1973; Yitzhaki, 1974) can be seen as little more than a specic
application of Beckers more general analysis.
The Beckerian approach considers the socially optimal enforcement strategy
in respect of the trade-o¤ between the ne rate and the probability of de-
tection. As applied to tax compliance, a key insight is that a government
concerned with maximizing the expected utility of a representative citizen
should set the ne rate on evaded tax as high as possible, and the audit
probability as low as possible: a result Kolm (1973) terms hang em with
probability zero.1 However, with ne rates for tax evasion not exceeding
two in the US and UK, the policy relevance of this result has been widely
questioned (e.g., Dhami and al-Nowaihi, 2006).
The analysis here di¤ers from Beckers approach in two important respects.
First, whereas Becker considers the socially optimal enforcement strategy,
I consider the tax authoritys privately optimal enforcement strategy for a
given objective function set by government. In this sense, there is no pre-
sumption that the equilibrium of the model is socially e¢ cient. The second
di¤erence is that, whereas the Beckerian framework focuses on the trade-o¤
between audit probability and the ne rate, I focus on the trade-o¤ between
audit probability and audit e¤ectiveness (the proportion of non-compliance
that an audit detects). I argue that this trade-o¤ is of greater practical sig-
nicance to the work of tax authorities, as their ability to set ne rates is
much more limited than is typically recognized in the literature (Slemrod,
2007).
1Subsequent literature analyzing this trade-o¤ includes Stern (1978) and Polinsky and
Shavell (1979).
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Audit e¤ectiveness has, to date, received little attention to in the literature.
The standard portfolio model, for instance, assumes that the tax authority is
able to perform audits that are fully e¤ective. The few studies that do allow
for imperfect audit e¤ectiveness include Alm (1988), Alm and McKee (2006),
Reinganum and Wilde (1986) and Snow and Warren (2005a,b). None of
these studies, however, investigates the trade-o¤ between audit e¤ectiveness
and audit probability. Reinganum and Wilde (1986) assume that audits are
either fully e¤ective or fully ine¤ective. However, it seems realistic to allow for
audits to be partially e¤ective. Also, their approach implies that, if taxpayers
are able to compute compound lotteries correctly, the compliance e¤ect of a
change in audit e¤ectiveness is the same as the e¤ect of an equivalent change
in audit probability (Alm and McKee, 2006). I therefore adopt the approach
of Snow and Warren (2005a,b), who allow audits to detect a proportion
q 2 [0; 1] of undeclared income. With this approach, audit e¤ectiveness
enters taxpayer utility di¤erently to audit probability, making the compliance
e¤ects of these two parameters distinct.
Similar to the model of Reinganum and Wilde (1985), I model the strategic
interaction between taxpayers and the tax authority in a principal-agent set-
ting where the tax authority (principal) commits to an audit strategy, then
taxpayers (agents) maximize expected utility, taking as given the choice of
the tax authority. However, income a random variable in Reinganum and
Wilde (1985) is, in my model, an exogenous variable, equal across taxpay-
ers. This simplication implies that random auditing is weakly optimal, so
moving the focus of the model away from the problem of optimal audit se-
lection towards the problem of setting a common audit probability, given the
reaction function of taxpayers and the trade-o¤ between audit probability
and e¤ectiveness. By contrast, when taxpayers di¤er in income, Reinganum
and Wilde (1985) show that there exist audit strategies which condition on
taxpayers reported incomes (such as a cuto¤ rule) that may dominate a
random audit strategy.
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Although I shall argue that my approach is consistent with that of Becker,
I nevertheless demonstrate that it gives rise to a number of descriptively
important di¤erences in prediction. First, the expected-revenue maximiz-
ing audit strategy does not maximize voluntary compliance. Instead, the
optimal audit probability exceeds that consistent with the maximization of
compliance such that, in equilibrium, a marginal increase in the probability
of audit reduces declared income. Second, although the tax authority still
has an incentive to raise the ne rate if it is able, Beckers hang em with
probability zeroequilibrium does not emerge. Rather, at all interior solu-
tions of the model, the optimal e¤ectivene rate on undeclared tax does
not exceed two. Third, compliance is non-monotonic in the tax authoritys
budget.
As extensions to the basic model I investigate the implications for my results
if taxpayers exhibit probability weighting of the form supposed by prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), and
if taxpayers are uncertain as to the true audit probability or e¤ectiveness.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 motivates the main aspects of
my approach, while Section 3 outlines a model of taxpayerscompliance de-
cision, and the tax authoritys optimal audit strategy. Section 4 analyzes the
main results, and Section 5 provides some extensions. Section 6 concludes.
2 Modelling the Tax Authority
In order to model the tax authority, it is necessary to specify its objective
function. This is, in practice, determined by negotiation between tax au-
thorities and government. From a law enforcement perspective, the relevant
objective would be to maximize voluntary compliance. However politicians
may have an instrumental concern for maximizing expected revenue (which
comprises receipts and penalties from audit activity, in addition to volun-
tary compliance). Consistent with the latter interpretation, the British tax
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authority is committed to a legal obligation to maximize expected revenue
(Ratto, Thomas and Ulph, forthcoming).2 The literature on optimal audit
rules (e.g. Graetz et al., 1986; Reinganum and Wilde, 1985, 1986) also takes
expected revenue to be the tax authoritys objective function. Accordingly, in
what follows I assume the remit of the tax authority is to maximize expected
revenue.
Although scal policy, the tax authority budget, and the ne rate on non-
compliance, are all endogenous at the level of government, I treat these as
exogenous to the tax authority. In government, responsibility for the col-
lection of taxes is usually decoupled from the setting of scal policy the
former being considered an operational matter, the latter one of policy. For
instance, in the US, responsibility for the collection of taxes resides with an
operational bureau of the Department of the Treasury, the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), whereas responsibility for scal policy lies on the policy side
of the Department the O¢ ce of Tax Policy.3
Tax authorities must also negotiate a budget with government. Budget set-
tlements occur only periodically, so, in the short run, tax authorities operate
on a pre-determined budget.4 Fine rates usually require costly legislation to
change, and are, in most countries, heavily constrained by the desire for pun-
ishments to be proportionate to the perceived seriousness of the crime. For
instance, Kirchler et al. (2003) nd socially positive attitudes towards tax
avoidance among students, scal o¢ cers and small business owners in Aus-
tria, suggesting that some types of non-compliance are, in some countries,
2Although the best characterization of the IRS is less clear, Plumley and Steuerle
(2004) state that IRS enforcement programs have traditionally pursued the objective of
maximizing the revenue that they produce from the taxpayers whom they contact, subject
to their budget constraint.
3This structure is mirrored in the UK between H.M. Treasury and its collection agency,
H.M. Revenue and Customs (HMRC).
4As I treat the tax authoritys budget as xed, the concern of the paper is not, therefore,
how the tax authoritys budget compares with any putative social optimum (see Slemrod
and Yitzhaki, 1987), but on how the tax authority chooses to spend its budget.
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socially acceptable.
The tool most readily available to tax authorities is therefore the legal right
to perform audits. For a given audit technology, I characterize the tax au-
thoritys audit strategy by the pair (p; q) where p is audit probability and q
is audit e¤ectiveness. The tax authority can be modelled as choosing either
p or q, as for a given choice of one, the other is determined endogenously by
the budget constraint: the tax authority therefore faces a trade-o¤ between
the number of audits it performs, and the e¤ectiveness of each audit.
3 A Model
3.1 Preliminaries
There are n taxpayers, each with an exogenous taxable income y (which
is known by the taxpayer but not by the tax authority). The government
levies a proportional income tax at marginal rate  on declared income x. A
proportion p of taxpayers are randomly selected for audit each year and, when
performed, an audit detects a proportion q of the true level of undeclared
tax. Following Yitzhaki (1974), taxpayers face a ne at rate f > 1 on all
detected undeclared tax. The e¤ectivene rate is therefore given by qf .
The timing of the model is as follows: in the rst stage, the tax authority
publicly pre-commits to a pair (p; q), and in the second stage, taxpayers
choose an optimal level of declared income, taking as given the tax-authoritys
choice of (p; q).
3.2 TaxpayersProblem
Taxpayers are assumed to act as if they maximize expected utility, where
utility, U [], satises the following properties:
A1. U [x] is continuous and twice di¤erentiable for all x  0.
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A2. U 0 [x] > 0 and U 00 [x] < 0.
A3. A [x]   U 00 [x] =U 0 [x] is decreasing in x.
Assumption A1 is a standard technical assumption. Assumption A2 implies
that taxpayers are risk averse. Following Arrow (1965) and Allingham and
Sandmo (1972), assumption A3 is decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA).
Taxpayers choose x, taking scal policy and the tax authoritys audit strategy
as given, yielding the problem
max
x
E [U ] = (1  p)U [y   x] + pU [y   x  qf (y   x)] . (1)
For notational convenience I dene
Wg  y   x; Wb  Wg   qf (y   x) ;
then di¤erentiating expected utility in (1) with respect to x gives
@E [U ]
@x
 T [x; p] =  fp (qf   1)U 0 [Wb]  (1  p)U 0 [Wg]g . (2)
The rst order condition for an interior maximum of (1) is therefore T [x; p] =
0, which implicitly denes a function x [p; qf ] that maps taxpayersopti-
mal income declaration as a function of the audit probability and the ef-
fective ne rate. The second derivative of expected utility is denoted by
@2E [U ] = (@x)2  D [x; p]. The second order condition, D < 0, is satised by
the assumption of strict concavity of the utility function. The conditions for
the existence of an interior maximum are
U 0 [y]
U 0 [y (1  qf)] <
p (qf   1)
1  p < 1. (3)
The rst condition in (3) requires as a necessary condition that qf > 1, for
if qf < 1 non-compliance pays even in the audit state. The second condition
in (3) requires that pqf < 1, which is the standard condition that the tax
gamble must be better than fair.
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3.3 Audit E¤ectiveness
I assume that audit e¤ectiveness is a function of the labor expended, q =
h [L], where h [] has the following properties:
A4. h [L] is continuous and twice di¤erentiable for all L  0.
A5. h[0] = 0 and limL"1 h[L] = 1.
A6. h0 [] > 0.
A7. h00 [] < 0.
Assumption A4 is a standard technical assumption. Assumption A5 is the
idea that if the tax authority does not expend any resource on an audit, it
will not detect any non-compliance, but a very resource-intensive audit can
ultimately detect all non-compliance. Assumption A6 is that audit e¤ec-
tiveness increases as a function of labor. Last, assumption A7 is that audit
e¤ectiveness exhibits diminishing returns to labor. Diminishing returns in
this context can arise as, unlike many other types of crime, non-compliance
takes a great many shapes and forms, each of which di¤ers according to the
ease with which it can be detected. The most readily detectable forms of non-
compliance may be exposed relatively cheaply, but it becomes increasingly
labor consuming to detect further instances of non-compliance.
3.4 Tax Authoritys Problem
Let k 2 [0; n] be the number of audits performed by the tax authority. For
a xed budget allocation b, and normalizing the price of labor to pL = 1,
the budget constraint of the tax authority is given by kL  b, which implies
an audit probability p  k=n. When the tax authoritys budget constraint
is binding it holds that q = h [L] = h [=p], where   b=n is the per-
capita budget of the tax authority. The inverse relationship between p and
q makes clear the trade-o¤ in audit strategy between audit probability and
e¤ectiveness.
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I am now able to bring together the budget constraint q = h [=p] and
the taxpayer behavioral function x [p; qf ] to dene a function X [p; f ] 
x [p; h [=p] f ] that describes the compliance behavior of taxpayers, taking
explicit account of the endogeneity of the e¤ective ne rate.
The problem facing the tax authority is to choose the audit probability so
as to maximize expected revenue, subject to its budget constraint and its
understanding of the behavioral response of taxpayers (as summarized by
taxpayersrst order condition). Expected revenue is composed of that gen-
erated directly in nes from non-compliance detected at audit (direct e¤ect),
and that arising indirectly from voluntary compliance induced by the threat
of audit (indirect e¤ect), giving:
max
p
E [R] = n fX [p; f ] + ph [=p] f (y  X [p; f ])g . (4)
Di¤erentiating E [R] in (4) with respect to p gives:
@E [R]
@p
 G [X; p] = n

(Wg  Wb) (1  eq) + @X [p; f ]
@p
(1  ph [=p] f)

;
(5)
where, from (2),
@X [p; f ]
@p
=   
D

U 0 [Wg]  U 0 [Wb] f1  fh [=p] (1  eq)g
+eq (h [=p] f   1) (Wg  Wb)U 00 [Wb]

; (6)
and eq [L]  Lh0 [L] =h [L] 2 (0; 1) is the elasticity of audit e¤ectiveness with
respect to labor.
The tax authoritys rst order condition for an interior maximum is therefore
G [X; p] = 0, which implicitly denes a function X [p; f ] that maps taxpay-
ersoptimal income declaration given the ne rate and the tax authoritys
optimal choice of audit probability. It is instructive to explore the region of
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 that generates interior optima for compliance. In particular, there exist
( ,) such that taxpayersoptimal income declaration can be written as:
X [p; f ;  ]
8<:
= 0    ;
2 (0; y)  2 ( ; ) ;
= y    ;
where ( ,) are the unique solutions to
U 0 [y]
U 0 [y (1  h [=p [ ]] f)] =
p [ ] (h [=p [ ]] f   1)
1  p [ ] ; h [ ] f = 1. (7)
The expression for  derives from the full-compliance outcome (pqf = 1),
which is always the equilibrium of the model if it is feasible. As ph [=p] is
increasing in p, pqf = 1 is achieved at least cost by setting p = 1, from which
the result follows. The expression for  is simply the rst inequality in (3).
So far as I know, there are no tax authorities so lavishly funded as to have
eliminated non-compliance, nor any so impoverished as to be unable to en-
force any positive level of compliance. Therefore, were the model calibrated
empirically, I would expect observed values of  to be consistent with an
interior solution for compliance. This point is of importance in what follows,
as the analysis makes strong predictions for all equilibria with an interior
solution for compliance.
The problem in (4) is not a standard concave maximization problem: the
objective function is convex and the constraint function is neither globally
concave nor convex (Figure 1). I am nevertheless able to state my rst
Proposition, establishing the existence of a unique optimal choice of p by the
tax authority (all proofs being in the Appendix):
Proposition 1 For  2 ( ,) there exists a unique p 2 (0; 1) such that
G [X; p;  ] = 0 and X [p; f ;  ] 2 (0; y).
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The proof of existence establishes that G [X; p] switches sign on a sub-interval
of (0; 1) which guarantees the result by continuity. The proof of uniqueness
is complicated by the fact that X [p; f ] is convex for p close to zero, and
concave thereafter. As, however, X [p; f ] is always increasing on the convex
interval, this feature of the model does not generate multiple equilibria. The
possibility of the objective and constraint functions coinciding, except at a
single point, on the concave interval is ruled out by consideration of the roots
of each function at x = 0.
If the tax authoritys budget does not lie on the interval [ ;  ], then taxpayers
are at a corner solution, and the properties of the equilibrium are as follows:
Proposition 2 If
i)    the equilibrium satises p = 1, q = h [ ], x = 0;
ii)    the equilibrium satises ph [=p] f = 1, x = y.
In part (i) of the Proposition, the tax authority is insu¢ ciently resourced
to generate a positive indirect e¤ect, so seeks solely to maximize the direct
e¤ect. This is achieved by maximizing the value of ph [=p], which implies
p = 1. By contrast, in part (ii), the indirect e¤ect is maximal, and the direct
e¤ect is zero.
4 Analysis
In this section, I characterize interior solutions of the model in order to
contrast the properties of the taxpayer behavioral function x [p; qf ], which
are those of the standard portfolio model, with the properties of X [p; f ].
4.1 Compliance
A well-known prediction of the standard model is that an increase in au-
dit probability increases compliance, i.e. @x [p; qf ] =@p > 0. However, the
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ceteris paribus condition under which qf is held constant implicitly pre-
supposes an accompanying increase in the tax authoritys budget. Under the
extension to balanced-budget analysis I obtain the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 At all interior equilibria an increase in audit probability de-
creases compliance: @X
[p;f ]
@p
< 0.
Proposition 3 follows immediately from the tax authoritys rst order condi-
tion in (5). The rst term in (5) is the marginal change in the direct e¤ect
from an increase in p, while the second term captures the marginal change
in the indirect e¤ect. The former e¤ect is always positive, while the latter
takes the sign of @X [p; f ] =@p. For @X [p; f ] =@p > 0 both the indirect and
direct e¤ect are increasing in p, so @X [p; f ] =@p > 0 is never optimal. By
similar reasoning, @X [p; f ] =@p = 0 (the compliance maximizing choice of p),
is never optimal. Instead, the optimal audit probability must be such that
@X [p; f ] =@p < 0. At the optimal audit probability the marginal increase in
the direct e¤ect is fully o¤set by the marginal decrease in the indirect e¤ect,
so not only is the indirect e¤ect negative at an interior optimum, it is also
strong enough to o¤set the direct e¤ect.
An implication of Proposition 3 is that audit probability is optimally set
higher than the compliance maximizing level, and audit e¤ectiveness is set
lower than the compliance maximizing level. This suggests a tension between
the role of the tax authority as a law enforcer (as envisaged by Becker), and
as a revenue raiser: to maximize expected revenue the tax authority nds
it optimal to tolerate a degree of non-compliance that it could, if it chose,
prevent.
The Proposition relies both on the assumptions that the tax authority max-
imizes expected revenue and that audit e¤ectiveness is endogenous. First,
were the tax authority assumed to maximize compliance, then @X [p; f ] =@p =
0 would, by assumption, dene the optimal choice of p. Second, if audit ef-
fectiveness were to be assumed exogenous, which is equivalent to setting
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eq = 0, there would be no trade-o¤ between audit probability and e¤ective-
ness and the standard result of the Beckerian framework would re-emerge:
@X [p; f ] =@p = @x [p; qf ] =@p > 0.
4.2 E¤ective Fine Rate
As a straightforward application of the envelope theorem, it can be shown
that expected revenue is a (weakly) increasing function of f (and strictly
increasing for  < ). As such, the model retains the basic insight behind
Beckers hang em with probability zero equilibrium: unless equilibrium
non-compliance is already zero, if the tax authority is able to increase f , it
has the incentive to do so.
However, in the present model, the tax authority is not able to choose f , but
is able to choose the e¤ective ne rate, qf , through its choice of q. What
this approach reveals is that, even were the tax authority able to convince
the relevant legislatures to approve a high f , it would in turn be optimal for
the tax authority to reduce q (and increase p), such that the e¤ective ne
rate turns out to be bounded at all interior equilibria.
Proposition 4 At all interior equilibria the e¤ective ne rate on undetected
tax satises qf < 2.
Some intuition for Proposition 4 lies in the observation that the equilibrium
qf is not monotonically increasing as a function of f . To see this, rst note
that, analogous to ( ; ), there exist (f; f), which denote the upper and lower
bounds of f consistent with an interior equilibria for compliance. Then:
qf
8<:
 1 f  f ;
> 1 f 2  f; f ;
= 1 f  f:
(8)
For f  f , we have p = 1 from Proposition 2, in which case to have T [x; p] <
0 in (2) requires qf < 1. For f 2  f; f the condition in (8) is implied by
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the interior conditions for compliance in (3). For f = f , that qf = 1 is
immediate from (7) as p = pqf = 1.
The above arguments demonstrate that qf is increasing in f as f # f , but
decreasing as f " f , so qf attains a local maximum on the interval f 2  f; f.
The proof of Proposition 4 demonstrates that all such interior equilibria
satisfy qf 2  1;min p 1; (1  p) 1, which is a sub-interval of (1; 2) for
p 2 (0; 1). The non-monotonicity of qf reects the balanced budget trade-
o¤ between audit probability and the e¤ective ne rate: for a xed f , an
increase in qf requires a compensating reduction in p. Because q is subject to
diminishing returns, it follows that raising the e¤ective ne rate indenitely
is not optimal.
A bounded e¤ective ne rate therefore emerges as the optimal choice of the
tax authority, rather than being articially imposed. The result ts closely
with empirical evidence: the Internal Revenue Code species f = 1:75 for
fraudulent returns, while HMRC apply f = 2 for intentional non-compliance,
both of which imply an e¤ective ne rate of less than two (assuming q < 1).
4.3 Audit Expenditure
Suppose that the tax authority receives an exogenous increase in  , either as
a result of an increase in b, or a fall in n.
Proposition 5 As  "  it holds that:
lim"
@p
@
> 0; lim"
@q
@
< 0; lim"
@X[p;f ]
@
< 0.
Simple intuition for the comparative static result for audit probability is as
follows. I have from (7) that p j= = 1, but interior optima satisfy pqf < 1
and qf > 1, which together imply p < 1=qf < 1. Therefore audit probability
must be increasing as  "  . Similarly for q, I have from (7) that q j= = 1=f ,
but the interior conditions imply q > 1=f , so audit e¤ectiveness must be
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decreasing as  "  . Formally, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for these
two results is that =p is decreasing in  (@p=@ > p=) as  "  . The proof
proceeds by contradiction to show that, if @p=@ = p= as  "  , then the
respective rst order conditions for the taxpayer and the tax authority are
not simultaneously satised.
Due to model complexity, the comparative static results for p and q are proved
only local to  =  . However, Figure 2 depicts the optimal audit regime
for a simulation of the model with logarithmic utility, U [y] = ln y, (which
implies constant relative risk aversion) and exponential audit e¤ectiveness,
h [L] = 1   e 2L. For this simple specication of the model, and choosing
reasonable values for the ne and tax rates (f = 1:5,  = 0:3), p and q
respond monotonically to  over the whole interval  2 [ ;  ].5 In these
cases audit e¤ectiveness is an inferior input in the productionof expected
revenue.
The nal result in Proposition 5 is that optimal compliance is non-monotonic
in  near  =  (Figure 3). Although optimal compliance is seen to fall in this
region, nevertheless expected revenue continues to increase: the tax authority
chooses to allow non-compliance to increase in response to an increase in  ,
even though it could choose to allow it to decrease. Some intuition from the
result is seen by rewriting expected revenue in (4) as
E [R] = n f (1  pqf)X [p; f ] + pqfyg . (9)
The rst term in (9) is dependent on the level of compliance, while the
second is independent of the level of compliance. Near  =  I have that
pqf ! 1, so, from (9), the compliance-independent component accounts for
an increasing proportion of total expected revenue. In the limit, the costs
5The level of income, y, can be chosen arbitrarily under constant relative risk aversion:
the taxpayers optimal compliance (x [p; qf ]) is linear in income, so acts only as a scale
parameter.
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of lowering X [p; f ] become dominated by the gains from increasing the
compliance-independent component of expected revenue.
5 Extensions
5.1 Probability Weighting
A prominent feature of descriptive accounts of decision-making under risk is
that individuals tend to overweight unlikely outcomes and underweight likely
outcomes, relative to their objective probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Neilson, 2003). Consistent with this idea, empirical studies of tax-
payers subjective beliefs about their audit probability suggest that many
subjects overestimate this (low) probability (e.g. Alm et al., 1992; Scholz
and Pinney, 1995). It is therefore of interest to examine how this considera-
tion alters the analysis of the previous section.
Following the insights of Quiggin (1982), probability weighting is modelled
by a transformation of the cumulative probability distribution according to
a probability weighting function, w [p], on which I make the following as-
sumptions. First, w [p] is continuous, di¤erentiable on p 2 (0; 1), strictly
increasing, and satises w [0] = 0 and w [1] = 1. Second, there exists a
pf 2 (0; 1) at which w [p] intersects the diagonal from above. Third, it is
concave on an initial interval and convex beyond that (s-shaped).6 Denoting
(x; p; q) as the (interior) equilibrium of the model of Section 3 (without
probability weighting) and (xw; pw; qw) as the equilibrium of the model with
probability weighting, I then have the following Proposition:
Proposition 6 If taxpayers transform the objective audit probability accord-
ing to w[p] then for p 2 (0; 1):
6The various functional forms for w [p] so far proposed in the literature (e.g. Rieger
and Wang, 2006; Prelec, 1998; Tversky and Fox, 1994; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992)
each satisfy these assumptions.
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i) As p # 0 it holds that pw > p;
ii) If p = pf then pw < p;
iii) As p " 1 it holds that pw > p.
Proposition 6 makes clear that probability weighting can either increase or
decrease the optimal audit probability depending on the level of p. At
extreme audit probabilities - including the most realistic case of p close to
zero - the tax authority chooses a higher audit probability under probability
weighting. However, in an interval around the xed point at pf , probability
weighting lowers the tax authoritys optimal choice of p. The explanation is
that the optimal p depends both on the level of w [p] and its slope, w0 [p].
When w [] is overweighting there is an incentive to reduce p, as the bias
in taxpayers judgments is a substitute for the objective audit probability.
However, when w0 [p] > 1 there is an incentive to raise p, since w [p] increases
faster than p. Close to p = 0 and p = 1, w [p]  p and w0 [p] > 1,
so the slope e¤ect dominates, and is positive. At the xed point, however,
w0 [pf ] < 1, so the slope e¤ect is negative.
5.2 Uncertainty
The previous section assumes that taxpayers know the tax authoritys choice
of (p; q). In practice, however, taxpayers typically face uncertainty over both
of these parameters, as the choice is not normally announced.7 Let (ep; eq)
be random variables describing taxpayersuncertainty about (p; q), where I
assume that taxpayers expectations about (p; q) are rational in the sense
that E [ep] = p and E [eq] = q. Let (xu; pu; qu) denote the equilibrium under
uncertainty, then I have the following Proposition:
Proposition 7 Under p-uncertainty it holds that pu = p and qu = q.
7There may be sound theoretical grounds for maintaining secrecy (see, e.g., Alm, 1988;
Snow and Warren, 2005a).
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Proposition 7 demonstrates that the analysis of Section 4 is robust to tax-
payer uncertainty over p. The result is a straightforward consequence of
the linearity of taxpayers expected utility in audit probability. Formally,
suppose ep is distributed according to P ["], then taxpayersexpected utility
is
E [U ] = U [Wg]

1 
Z
" dP ["]

+ U [Wb]
Z
" dP ["] .
As rational expectations imply that
R
" dP ["] = p, the tax authoritys prob-
lem is therefore unchanged.
Turning to q-uncertainty, suppose eq is distributed according to Q ["], then
the taxpayersrst order condition in (2) becomes

Z
fp ("f   1)U 0 [Wb ["]]  (1  p)U 0 [Wg ["]]g dQ ["] = 0,
and (6) becomes
@Xu [p; f ]
@p
=  

U 0 [Wg] +
R
("f   1  qfeq)U 0 [Wb ["]] dQ ["]
+eq (Wg  Wb)
R
("f   1)U 00 [Wb ["]] dQ ["]



(1  p)U 00 [Wg] + p
R
("f   1)2 U 00 [Wb ["]] dQ ["]
	 . (10)
How the tax authoritys problem is a¤ected by q-uncertainty is determined
by whether the integrals in (10) are increasing or decreasing under a mean-
preserving spread of Q ["], which depends on both the third and fourth deriv-
atives of the utility function. In order to sign the fourth derivative of utility,
a stronger assumption than DARA is required. I therefore introduce the
concept of standard risk aversion (Kimball, 1993). Taxpayers are standard
risk averse if their preferences satisfy DARA (A3) and decreasing absolute
prudence (DAP).8 I then have a nal Proposition.
8DAP requires that  U 000 [x] =U 00 [x] is decreasing in x. For a more detailed inter-
pretation of standard risk aversion, and its relationship to other related risk concepts,
such as downside risk aversion (Menezes et al., 1980) and proper risk aversion (Pratt and
Zeckhauser, 1987), see the working paper version of this paper (Rablen, 2012).
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Proposition 8 If
i) Taxpayers are standard risk averse;
ii) Taxpayer beliefs satisfy
eqmax

qf;
1  p
2p

< qf   1 < eq

1  p
p

;
then, under q-uncertainty, pu < p and qu > q.
The proof of Proposition 8 proceeds by analyzing the second derivatives of
the integrands in (10) at the equilibrium of the model. Under the restrictions
of the Proposition, I am able to prove that @X [p; f ] =@p > @Xu [p; f ] =@p.
As the tax authority operates on the downward sloping interval of X [p; f ]
(Figure 1), to restore equilibrium it must raise p, from which the result fol-
lows. The restrictions in (ii) place limits on the dispersion of taxpayer beliefs
around the true value of q. In particular, they require that taxpayers believe
that the e¤ective ne rate satises qf > 1. If taxpayers place su¢ cient prob-
ability weight on the possibility that qf < 1, then the relative magnitudes of
pu and p can be reversed.
6 Conclusion
The economics of tax compliance has developed as a special case of Beckers
(1968) model of crime. However, the political economy considerations inher-
ent in the enforcement of compliance imply that the tax authority is not a
simple law enforcer, but also plays an economic role in raising government
revenue. I therefore consider the private objective function of the tax author-
ity to maximize expected revenue, rather than assuming the maximization
of social welfare. Second, with ne rates severely constrained in practice, I
instead analyze the trade-o¤ between audit probability and e¤ectiveness.
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Characterizing the tax authority in this way alters some of the predictions of
the standard portfolio model in descriptively important ways. In particular,
I show that at any interior equilibrium - the type that we observe empiri-
cally - the expected-revenue maximizing audit strategy does not maximize
voluntary compliance, and that increases in the tax authoritys budget can
lead to a fall in voluntary compliance, while still increasing expected revenue.
While not contradicting the intuition of Beckers hang em with probability
zero equilibrium, the model nevertheless leads to the conclusion that the
tax authority will choose to set an e¤ective ne rate that does not exceed
two - a prediction closely in line with observed practice.
In future research a key assumption one would like to relax is that of ho-
mogeneous taxpayers, which in turn might allow for an integration of the
present approach with the literature on the design of audit selection rules.
The model may also be used to develop policy implications for the optimal
p-q ratio in the design of audit interventions. When the tax authority is well
funded (high ), Figure 2 suggests that it optimally performs more light-
touchaudits, characterized by a high p and low q. For lower values of  ,
performing fewer, more rigorous, audits becomes optimal.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Existence: I begin by showing that limp#0G [X; p] > 0. As p # 0 I have that
h [=p] " 1 and eq # 0. Therefore, (6) gives
limp#0 @X [p; f ] =@p =   limp#0 (=D) (U 0 [Wg] + (f   1)U 0 [Wb]) > 0,
which, in turn, implies that limp#0G [X; p] = n limp#0

Wg  Wb +  @X[p;f ]@p

>
0. I now show thatG [X; p] < 0 where p = (h [=p] f   1) = (h [=p] f   1 + eq) <
1. Setting G [X; p] = 0 in (5), and substituting for @X[p;f ]
@p
from (6) I obtain:
(Wg  Wb)

(1  p) (1  eq)U 00 [Wg]
  (qf   1) feq (1  p)  p (qf   1)gU 00 [Wb]

= (1  pqf) fU 0 [Wg]  f1  qf (1  eq)gU 0 [Wb]g (A.1)
Suppose, by contradiction, that eq = p (qf   1) = (1  p), then substituting
in (A.1) obtains (Wg  Wb)U 00 [Wg] = (qf   1) (U 0 [Wb]  U 0 [Wg]), which is
a contradiction since the l.h.s. is negative and the r.h.s. is positive, implying
G [X; p] < 0. It follows, by continuity, that there exists a p satisfying p > 0
and p < (h [=p] f   1) = (h [=p] f   1 + eq) such that G [X; p] = 0.
Uniqueness: I rst show that E [R] is a convex function of (x; p): the de-
terminant of the Hessian matrix is jHj = (fn@ (ph [=p]) =@p)2 > 0. The
iso-expected revenue curves in Figure 1 are therefore concave to the origin.
The constraint X [p; f ] is not globally concave because, taking q as constant,
compliance is an increasing and convex function of p. Since q is approximately
constant close to unity, X [p; f ] is increasing and convex for p su¢ ciently close
to zero. However, to generate multiple equilibria would require X [p; f ] to be
downward sloping on the convex interval, and for the convex interval to be
sandwiched between two concave intervals, neither of which is the case.
It remains to check whether the constraint and objective functions coincide
at more than a single point on the interval where both are concave. To
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see this is not the case, note that iso-expected revenue intersects the line
x = 0 for p = pR, where pR = 1=h [=pR] f . The constraint X [p; f ] inter-
sects x = 0 for p = px (which may not be unique), where (1  px)U 0 [y]  
px (h [=px] f   1)U 0 [y (1  h [=px] f)] = 0. Substituting pR into the deni-
tion of px yields ((h [=pR] f   1) =h [=pR] f) (U 0 [y]  U 0 [y (1  h [=pR] f)]) <
0, from which it follows that that px < pR.
Proof of Proposition 2
Part (i): If x = 0 then E [R] = pqfy. Since @ (pq) =@p = q + p (@q=@p) =
q (1  eq) > 0 it follows that @E [R] =@p > 0, implying a corner solution at
p = 1.
Part (ii): If pqf = 1 is feasible (  ) then there is always a solution to
G [X; p] = 0 in (5), since it implies that x = y, so also Wg = Wb.
Proof of Proposition 3
From (5) it is immediate that G [X; p] = 0 implies
@X [p; f ] =@p =   (Wg  Wb) (1  eq) = f (1  pqf)g < 0.
Proof of Proposition 4
From (3) an interior equilibrium for compliance must satisfy qf < p 1. I now
show that all interior equilibria also satisfy the inequality qf < (1  p) 1.
Suppose, by contradiction, that qf = (1  p) 1, so p = (qf   1) =qf and
pqf = qf 1. Substituting p = (qf   1) =qf in (2) gives U 0 [Wg] (qf   1)2 U 0 [Wb] =
0. Now also suppose  =  which implies eq = pqf . Substituting for eq in
(A.1) I obtain
G [X; p] = 0, (Wg  Wb) f(1  p)U 00 [Wg]  p (qf   1)U 00 [Wb]g
= U 0 [Wg]  f1  qf (1  pqf)gU 0 [Wb] . (A.2)
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Substituting from (2) in both sides gives:
G [X; p] = 0, (Wg  Wb) (1  p)U 0 [Wg] fA [Wb]  A [Wg]g
= p 1

U 0 [Wg]  (qf   1)2 U 0 [Wb]
	
= 0,
But this is a contradiction since the l.h.s. is strictly positive by assumption
A3 (DARA), while the r.h.s. is zero. It follows that (U 0 [Wg]  f1  qf (1  pqf)gU 0 [Wb])
cannot be zero at an interior equilibrium. Instead, for  2 ( ; ) ; it must hold
that (U 0 [Wg]  f1  qf (1  pqf)gU 0 [Wb]) < 0. This implies that U 0 [Wg] =U 0 [Wb] <
1 qf (1  pqf). Using (2) I have that U 0 [Wg] =U 0 [Wb] = p (qf   1) = (1  p),
so, solving the resulting quadratic in (qf), this implies that qf 2  1;min p 1; (1  p) 1.
Then maxpmin

p 1; (1  p) 1 = 2 (at p = 1=2), implying qf < 2.
Proof of Proposition 5
Suppose, by contradiction, that @p=@ = p= , such that @q=@ = @h [=p] =@ =
0. Then an increase in  in (2) leaves q unchanged and increases p. To restore
the rst order condition it follows that
@X[p;f ]
@p
 @p
@
= p

=   (=D [X; p]) (U 0 [Wg] + (qf   1)U 0 [Wb]) > 0. In the limit
as  "  I have that Wg  Wb ! 0 and qf ! 1, in which case @X[p;f ]@p
 @p
@
= p

collapses to lim"
@X[p;f ]
@p
 @p
@
= p

=  U 0 [Wg] = f (1  p)U 00 [Wg]g > 0. A fur-
ther expression for lim"
@X[p;f ]
@p
 @p
@
= p

is derived by total di¤erentiation of
the equality in (A.1), giving
lim"
@X[p;f ]
@p
 @p
@
= p

=  f(1  eq) =eqg fU 0 [Wg] = f (1  p)U 00 [Wg]gg.
The two expressions are equal i¤ lim" (1  eq) =eq = 1, which establishes a
contradiction since lim" eq = 1. From analysis of derivatives it follows that
lim" @p=@ > p= > 0, so also lim" @q=@ < 0.
To establish the sign of lim" @X [p; f ] =@ I can now denote @p=@ = p= ,
where  > 1 is a scalar. It follows that @q
@
 @p
@
=p

= qeq

(1  ) < 0. Di¤er-
entiating T [X; p] = 0 in (2) I have that:
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@X [p; f ]
@
 @p
@
=p

? 0,  7  eq fqfU
0 [Wb]  (qf   1) (Wg  Wb)U 00 [Wb]g
U 0 [Wg]  U 0 [Wb] f1  fq (1  eq)g
+eq (qf   1) (Wg  Wb)U 00 [Wb]
 :
(A.3)
In the limit as  "  , (A.3) implies that  >   lim" eq= (1  eq) < 0, so it
must be that lim" @X [p; f ] =@ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 6
Part (i): Under probability weighting (6) becomes:
@xw
@pw
=  


Ew
( w0 [pw]  U 0 Wwg + (qwf   1)U 0 [Wwb ]
+ewq

w[pw]
pw

(qwf   1)  Wwg  Wwb U 00 [Wwb ]  qwfU 0 [Wwb ]	
)
,
where Ew = 2

w [pw] (qwf   1)2 U 00 [Wwb ] + (1  w [pw])U 00

Wwg
	
. Sup-
pose, by contradiction, that (pw; xw) = (p; x) then I have that:
@xw
@pw
  @x

@p
=


DE
8<: p
 U 0 W g + (qf   1)U 0 [W b ]	w [p] (1  ew) (qf   1)2 U 00 [W b ]
+p f1  w0 [p]  w [p] (1  ew)gU 00

W g

 eq (w [p]  p)U 00

W g
 
(qf   1)  W g  W b   qfU 0 [W b ]	
9=; ,
(A.4)
where ew is the elasticity of w [p]. As p # 0 I have that w [p] = p, so ew [0] =
w0 [0] > 1. This implies that 1   w0 [0]   w [0] (1  ew [0]) = 1   w0 [0] < 0.
Using these observations in (A.4) yields that @x
w
@pw
  @x
@p > 0, contradicting the
supposed solution at (pw; xw) = (p; x). Since @G [x; p] =@p < 0 it follows
that pw > p, and therefore qw < q.
Part (ii): At p = pf I have ew = w
0 [pf ] < 1 and 1 w0 [p] w [p] (1  ew) =
(1  w [pf ]) (1  w0 [pf ]) > 0. Hence, @xw@pw   @x

@p < 0, contradicting the sup-
posed solution at (pw; xw) = (p; x). Since @G [x; p] =@p < 0 it follows that
pw < p, and therefore qw > q.
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Part (iii): As p " 1 I have ew [1] = w0 [1] > 1 and 1 w0 [1] w [1] (1  ew [1]) =
0. An analogous argument to Part (i) therefore applies.
Proof of Proposition 8
Substituting (10) into (5) gives
(Wg  Wb)

(1  p) (1  eq)U 00 [Wg]
  R ("f   1) feq (1  p)  p ("f   1)gU 00 [Wb ["]] dQ ["]

= (1  pqf)

U 0 [Wg] +
Z
("f   1  qfeq)U 0 [Wb ["]] dQ ["]

. (A.5)
Suppose, en route to a contradiction, that (p; x) = (pu; xu) then both (A.5)
and the equivalent relation under certainty (A.1) must hold. Taking the
second derivative of the integrand in the r.h.s. of (A.5) gives
@2 ("f   1  qfeq)
(@")2
=  

Wg  Wb
q

2U 00 [Wb]  ("f   1  qfeq)Wg  Wb
q
U 000 [Wb]

.
(A.6)
Within the second bracket, the rst term is negative under risk aversion and
the second is negative under downside risk aversion (as " > (1 + qfeq) =f
by assumption). According to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971), an integrand
increases (decreases) with a mean-preserving spread if it is convex (concave).
Therefore (A.6) implies
Z
("f   1  qfeq)U 0 [Wb ["]] dQ ["] > (qf   1  qfeq)U 0 [Wb] .
Using the assumption of decreasing absolute prudence, which implies U 0000 <
0, similar reasoning can be used to show that, if beliefs satisfy (eq (1  p) + 2p) =2pf <
" < (eq (1  p) + p) =pf , then
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Z
("f   1) feq (1  p)  p ("f   1)gU 00 [Wb ["]] dQ ["]
> (qf   1) feq (1  p)  p (qf   1)gU 00 [Wb] .
But then (A.1) and (A.5) cannot hold for (p; x) = (pu; xu) as the l.h.s. of
(A.5) is smaller than the l.h.s. of (A.1), while the r.h.s. of (A.5) exceeds the
r.h.s. of (A.1). Instead, it must hold that @X [p; f ] =@p > @Xu [p; f ] =@p. In
order to restore (5) it must hold that pu < p , which implies qu > q and,
as @X [p; f ] =@p < 0, xu > x.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium between taxpayers and the tax authority.
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Figure 2: Optimal audit probability and e¤ectiveness (for CRRA utilty and
h [L] as the exponential distribution function).
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Figure 3: Optimal compliance and expected revenue (for CRRA utilty and
h [L] as the exponential distribution function).
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